By: Haroon Baloch
 |
Title of published fact-finding mission's reporter 2012 -
By Haroon Baloch
|
The
fact-finding team of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has a stance in its
report on Balochistan issue that Frontier Corps (FC) and intelligence agencies
are behind enforced disappearances in the province and circumstances have
worsened following failures in punishments or probes in a consequential manner.
HRCP has
issued the report in Islamabad
A 14-member
fact-finding mission comprising of Chairperson HRCP Zohra Yusuf, provincial
vice-chairpersons Tahir Hussain Khan (Balochistan), Sher Muhammad Khan (Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa) and Amarnath Motumal (Sindh), Executive Council members Asma
Jahangir, Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani and Habib Tahir, journalists Arifa Noor and
Amir Mateen, novelist Muhammad Hanif and academic Prof. Azizuddin Ahmed,
Secretary General I.A. Rehman, Hussain Naqi and Najam U Din from HRCP
Secretariat and HRCP Quetta office coordinator Farid Ahmed visited Balochistan
on May 15th of this year. They spent five days to analyze the ground realities
behind severe violation of human rights in the province.
According to
report there are multiple layers of violence and tension in
Balochistan. Law and order was a problem that casts a long shadow on all
aspects of life. The crime wave that had engulfed urban Balochistan and the
main highways was either a mark of collusion or utter incompetence of the
authorities. The government, law enforcement and security agencies had
completely failed to deal with militant/insurgent, sectarian and criminal
elements.
Kidnappings for ransom had become a profitable enterprise. No perpetrator had been arrested or tried. It was difficult to see how the kidnappers could operate despite heavy security deployment.
There was a widespread feeling that the national media had abandoned Balochistan and not given as much coverage to the events and incidents as their importance demanded. Even when whole cities were shut down during a strike the media did not report that. Journalists in the field felt threatened from the security forces, militants and insurgents. The people in the districts affected by the insurgency in general and journalists in particular felt like hostages. If they said one thing they were traitors to one side and if they did not they were traitors to the other side. The stories that the journalists did file were often covered only in Balochistan editions of publications by national level media organizations. That prevented the people elsewhere in Pakistan from getting the true picture of the situation in the province.
The problems in Balochistan had long been looked at in the perspective of a Baloch insurgency and Baloch rights. There was a need to have a holistic look at all the problems in Balochistan, including those faced by a substantial Pakhtun population, the Hazaras, non-Muslims and settlers as well as economic and livelihood issues in the province.
There were complaints of the state’s inability or unwillingness to protect the lives of religious minorities as well as members of some Muslim sects. Killings and harassment of the settler population by the insurgents had led to the settlers shifting to Pakhtun-majority areas or to leave the province altogether.
Talibanization was growing in several areas. Unlike the past, religious fanaticism was not merely being exported to the province from elsewhere. It was now being bred in Balochistan. A growing network of madrassas had contributed to aggravation of inter-sect tensions. There were fears that the security forces were patronizing militants and Quetta was being turned into a haven for militants. There were said to be militants’ training camps in the province.
The total electricity need of Balochistan was very small compared to the needs of the other provinces. Yet the people in the province faced excessive electricity suspension. The people demanded that the government should accept an Iranian offer to supply 1,000 megawatts of electricity to Pakistan and use the same in Balochistan.
The provincial government was nowhere to be seen in the crises. The chief minister was away from the province for a lot of time and the provincial government held meetings regarding Balochistan outside the province. The provincial government seemed to have earned a lot of discredit in a short span of time. In probably the only example of its kind, all but one member of the provincial assembly was in the cabinet. After the 18th Amendment and the National Finance Commission Award, more funds had certainly become available to Balochistan but those did not seem to have trickled down. A general observation was that corruption had spiked by the same margin.
Kidnappings for ransom had become a profitable enterprise. No perpetrator had been arrested or tried. It was difficult to see how the kidnappers could operate despite heavy security deployment.
There was a widespread feeling that the national media had abandoned Balochistan and not given as much coverage to the events and incidents as their importance demanded. Even when whole cities were shut down during a strike the media did not report that. Journalists in the field felt threatened from the security forces, militants and insurgents. The people in the districts affected by the insurgency in general and journalists in particular felt like hostages. If they said one thing they were traitors to one side and if they did not they were traitors to the other side. The stories that the journalists did file were often covered only in Balochistan editions of publications by national level media organizations. That prevented the people elsewhere in Pakistan from getting the true picture of the situation in the province.
The problems in Balochistan had long been looked at in the perspective of a Baloch insurgency and Baloch rights. There was a need to have a holistic look at all the problems in Balochistan, including those faced by a substantial Pakhtun population, the Hazaras, non-Muslims and settlers as well as economic and livelihood issues in the province.
There were complaints of the state’s inability or unwillingness to protect the lives of religious minorities as well as members of some Muslim sects. Killings and harassment of the settler population by the insurgents had led to the settlers shifting to Pakhtun-majority areas or to leave the province altogether.
Talibanization was growing in several areas. Unlike the past, religious fanaticism was not merely being exported to the province from elsewhere. It was now being bred in Balochistan. A growing network of madrassas had contributed to aggravation of inter-sect tensions. There were fears that the security forces were patronizing militants and Quetta was being turned into a haven for militants. There were said to be militants’ training camps in the province.
The total electricity need of Balochistan was very small compared to the needs of the other provinces. Yet the people in the province faced excessive electricity suspension. The people demanded that the government should accept an Iranian offer to supply 1,000 megawatts of electricity to Pakistan and use the same in Balochistan.
The provincial government was nowhere to be seen in the crises. The chief minister was away from the province for a lot of time and the provincial government held meetings regarding Balochistan outside the province. The provincial government seemed to have earned a lot of discredit in a short span of time. In probably the only example of its kind, all but one member of the provincial assembly was in the cabinet. After the 18th Amendment and the National Finance Commission Award, more funds had certainly become available to Balochistan but those did not seem to have trickled down. A general observation was that corruption had spiked by the same margin.
(Click here to access complete report for detailed insight)
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